Public School Students\u27 Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination by Bowman, Kristi L.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2007
Public School Students' Religious Speech and
Viewpoint Discrimination
Kristi L. Bowman
Michigan State University College of Law, kristi.bowman@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Education Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students' Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 187 (2007-2008).
HeinOnline -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  187 2007-2008
PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS' RELIGIOUS SPEECH 
AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 
Kristi L. Bowman1 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 188 
II. STUDENTS' RELIGIOUS SPEECH AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE .... 193 
III. THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE AND RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT 
DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS ............................................................. 197 
A. How T-shirt Speech Differs from Other Speech ... .................. 199 
B. Before Morse: The Student Speech Trilogy ....... ..................... 201 
1. Tinker's Disruptiveness, and the Rights ofOthers .... 201 
a. Material and Substantial Disruption ................. 20 1 
b. Rights of Others ................................................. 205 
2. Fraser's Lewd, Crude, and Otherwise Out-of-Line 
Criteria ....................................................................... 207 
3. Hazelwood's School-Sponsored Speech ................... 209 
C. Viewpoint Discrimination in a Limited Public Forum ........... 211 
D. Bringing Morse into the Viewpoint Discrimination Debate ... 214 
1. The Morse Opinions .................................................. 214 
2. Implications for Viewpoint Discrimination ............... 216 
a. Direct Discussion (Though No Resolution) in 
Morse ................................................................. 217 
b. School is Different, Redux .................................. 219 
c. Restricting Other Viewpoints ............................. 220 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 222 
Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. An earlier version of this 
article was presented on April 13,2007, at an outstanding conference, The Religion Clauses in the 
21st Century, hosted by West Virginia University College of Law and the American Constitution 
Society. For their helpful comments, I am grateful to Mark S. Kende, William P. Marshall, Frank 
S. Ravitch, and John E. Taylor. Additionally, the Michigan State University Law Library pro-
vided excellent research assistance coordinated by Jane Edwards and Barbara Bean and executed 
by Brittany Bulleit, Joseph Dunn, Marc Kinnemann, and Jennifer Robbins; and Meg C. Parker 
provided valuable editorial assistance. Finally, I appreciate the research support provided by the 
University of Mississippi School of Law during my year as a visiting member of that faculty. 
187 
HeinOnline -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  188 2007-2008
188 WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 110 
T -shirt Front: BE ASHAMED! OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED 
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED 
Back: HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL Romans 1:27 
- T-shirt worn by student Tyler Harper in Poway, Cali-
fornia in 20052 
T -shirt Front: ABORTION IS HOMICIDE 
Back: YOU WILL NOT SILENCE MY MESSAGE! YOU 
WILL NOT MOCK MY GOD! YOU WILL STOP KILLING 
MY GENERATION! ROCK FOR LIFE! 
- T-shirt worn by student K.D. in Fillmore, New York 
during 2003 and 20043 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The scene is hardly unusual in public schools: A student wears aT-shirt 
with a provocative, religiously-based statement-perhaps one of those reprinted 
immediately above-and finds him or herself referred to the principal's office 
for possible disciplinary action.4 Moments later,5 a school administrator must 
2 This was the T-shirt speech at issue in Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 445 F.3d 
1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), cen. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to 
dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). 
This was the T-shirt speech at issue in K.D. v. Fillmore Central School District, 2005 WL 
2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005). T-shirt available online at http://americanlifeleague.stores. 
yahoo.netJabishom.htrnl (last visited July 19, 2007). This T-shirt also was worn by a student 
enrolled in a school district I represented while in practice. I was involved in assessing the dis-
trict's options for responding to the T-shirt. I do not know what action the district took, if any, 
and to the best of my knowledge the situation did not lead to litigation. 
4 For media accounts of such conflicts, see, e.g., Candace Taylor, Student Opposition to Civil 
Unions Disrupts SWHS, JOURNAL INQUIRER, Apr. 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.journalinquirer.com (archives) (high school students were told they could not wear T-
shirts with Biblical speech about homosexuality because it was "hate speech"); Asher Abrams, 
Know Your Rights: Clothing a Form of Free Speech? THE SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Apr. 27, 
2007, at E-3 (student told she could not wear a "rock concert T-shirt with the words 'Jesus Freak' 
written on the front and a bible verse on the back"); Melissa Jenco, Free speech, student safety at 
hean of suit, CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Mar. 23, 2007, at 5 (two high school students sued their 
school district after they were told they could not wear anti-gay T-shirts); Charles Haynes, Both 
sides must show respect in gay student debate, THE TENNESSEAN, July 14, 2006, at 17 A (A week 
after Harper v. Poway was decided in the Ninth Circuit, 13 students were suspended from a Sac-
ramento-area school for wearing T-shirts declaring: "Homosexuality is sin. Jesus can set you free" 
and around the same time, other schools in the region sent students home for wearing T-shirts 
with similar statements); Jennifer Skalka, T-shin campaigns divide school; Students stand up for 
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answer a question that appears deceptively simple: By wearing this T-shirt to 
school, has the student done something that merits punishment? The teachers 
and administrators who encounter these situations often are frustrated by this 
question6-and understandably so, because lower courts' decisions reveal a sig-
nificant lack of clarity in the law.7 
their beliefs, CHlCAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 2005, at 3 (students were permitted to wear T-shirts 
saying "gay? fine by me" but not T-shirts saying "Crimes committed against God" on the front 
and "discrimination against ... my 10 Commandments, my prayers, my values, my faith, my 
God" because the latter T-shirts apparently were not approved by the school under the materials 
distribution policy before they were handed out) (another student created his own T-shirt saying 
"It's not OK to be gay'.'; the side of the T-shirt had a rainbow with a slash through it); Mike 
Hoyem, Student awaits anti-abonion pamphlet ruling, THE NEWS-PRESS, Apr. 13, 2004, at IB 
(student wants to wear a T-shirt showing graves beneath the words "45 Million Abortions Since 
1973"); Shamus McGillicuddy, Antiwar 'Jesus' shirt OK'd to wear in school; Donning it violates 
no rule, principal decides, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Mar. 12,2003, at 1 (student eventually allowed 
to wear a T-shirt saying "Who would Jesus bomb?" after being briefly detained by the school 
administration while they consulted district counsel). 
5 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (acknowledging that administrators make 
these decisions "to act-or not to act-on the spot"). 
6 Id. at 2639 (Breyer, S., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Teachers are neither 
lawyers nor police officers; and the law should not demand that they fully understand the intrica-
cies of our First Amendment jurisprudence."); see generally Curry ex rei. Curry v. Sch. Dist. Of 
the City of Saginaw, 452 F.Supp.2d 723, 733-34 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (see the court's discussion 
granting the teacher qualified immunity); Andrew Trotter, Consensus is Sought on Religion in 
Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 14, 2007, at 5 ('''[S]chool boards are getting a lot of bad advice' on 
handling religious issues, and many administrators fear that their attempts to resolve these issues 
may backfire and inflame latent conflicts."). 
7 The Brief for Petitioner Deborah Morse in Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618, n.15 (2007), 
chronicled comments from various courts regarding student free speech cases: 
See. e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1193 & n.l (9th 
Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Reconciling Tinker and Fraser is no 
easy task"; acknowledging that, at the time of the incident in Frederick, the 
parameters of "plainly offensive" speech under Fraser were still in flux), cert. 
granted. judgment vacated. case remanded, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Hosty v. 
Caner, 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing that many aspects of 
student speech law "are difficult to understand and apply"); Denno v. Sch. Bd. 
of Vol usia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1273 (lIth Cir. 2000) ("[T]he fact that the 
district court judge found the legal landscape so unclear as to include the al-
ternative Fraser holding discussed above remains strong evidence that the law 
was not clearly established that Tinker prohibited individual defendants' ac-
tions, as opposed to the more flexible reasonableness or balancing standard of 
Fraser permitting them."); McIntyre, 804 F. Supp. at 1426 (describing Fraser 
as "oblique at best and certainly less than clear"); see also Cindy Lavorato & 
John Saunders, Public High School Students. T-shirts. and Free Speech: Un-
tangling the Knots, 209 ED. LAW. REP. 1, I (2006) ("As a result of the numer-
ous applications of Fraser, the extent of students' free speech in public 
schools is more than a bit tangled."); Justin T. Peterson, Comment, School Au-
thority v. Students' First Amendment Rights: Is Subjectivity Strangling the 
Free Mind at Its Source?, 3 MICH. ST. L. REv. 931, 932-33 (2005) (examining 
the "confusion surrounding existing Supreme Court precedent" and asserting 
that "neither students nor school officials understand what students' free 
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To begin with, perhaps contrary to common assumptions, the Free 
Speech Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause, often does the so-called "heavy 
lifting" work of protecting individuals' religious liberty interests. 8 Yet, the de 
facto substitution of the Free Speech Clause for religion clauses doctrine in 
many of these situations hardly has been one without problems.9 Furthermore, 
as often happens, free speech doctrine in the elementary and secondary public 
school context differs from free speech doctrine generallylO and accordingly 
presents its own set of unresolved questions. I I 
8 
speech rights are in the school environment"); Douglas W. Kmiec et al., Indi-
vidual Rights and the American Constitution 574 (2004) ("[B]alanc[ing] the 
students' need to exercise their First Amendment rights with the school au-
thorities' needs to maintain order to carry out their educational tasks ... is one 
of the murkier area'> of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment 
Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 
527,542 (2000) ('There are literally dozens of lower federal court cases over 
the last thirty years dealing with student speech. They follow no consistent 
pattern; some are quite speech-protective and follow Tinker's philosophy as 
well as its holding, while others are very restrictive of student speech and treat 
Tinker as if it has been overruled."). 
See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkie, The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and Why?, 33 LoY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 95 (2001); Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REv. 379 (2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 
68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 925 (2000); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. 
CT. REV. I (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 71 
(2001). 
9 See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, Student Religious Expression in School: Is It Religion or 
Speech, and Does it Matter, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 377,381 (1994) ("Relying on free speech prin-
ciples to protect student religious expression is ... unsatisfactory and unacceptable.") 
10 I often tell my education law students that examining constitutional law in K-12 public 
schools is a bit like looking at one's self in a fun house mirror-although the basic image (or 
constitutional principle) is the same, we do not have to look very closely to see some significant 
variations from the image we would expect to be reflected back-this part is taller, that one is 
wider, something else is barely there. These variations occur because the Court has been respon-
sive to the knowledge that the primary constitutional rights-holders in schools, the students, are 
more vulnerable not only because of their young age. For example, school-led prayer is not per-
mitted in schools, but state legislatures may open with prayer; the Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992), coercion principle is absent from cases where the subjects are adults; search and seizure 
requirements are much more lenient inside schools than elsewhere. See generally James E. Ryan, 
The Supreme Coun and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1388 (2000) (individuals' constitu-
tional rights also vary more frequently in prison and military contexts). Additionally, couns have 
recognized that students are a captive audience due to compulsory school attendance statutes in 
place across the nation. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, Table 3.11 Compul-
sory School Attendance Laws and Exemptions, By State: 2005 (2006), available at: 
http://nces.ed.gov/prograrns/statereformlres_tabll.asp (all 50 states and the District of Columbia 
have compulsory attendance laws). 
II At oral argument in Morse v. Frederick, the following colloquy occurred: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think the law was so clearly established 
when this happened that the principal, that the instant the banner was unfurled, 
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The student religious T-shirt speech situations help to isolate one of 
those questions. What speech rights does a student retain if his or her individ-
uall2 religious speech is substantially and materially disruptive of the educa-
tional process (or reasonably anticipated to have this effect)-perhaps more 
disruptive than speech from other religious or non-religious viewfoints? The 
situation giving rise to Harper v. Poway Unified School District, I nearly pre-
snowballs are flying around, the torch is coming, should have said oh, I re-
member under Tinker I can only take the sign down if it's disruptive. But 
then under Fraser I can do something if it interferes with the basic mission, 
and under Kuhlmeier I've got this other thing. So she should have known at 
that point that she could not take the banner down, and it was so clear that she 
should have to payout of her own pocket because of it. 
MR. MERTZ [attorney for Frederick]: Mr. Chief Justice, there are two differ-
ent time points we have to talk about. There's the heat of the moment out 
there on the street, but then later back in the office when she actually decided 
to levy the punishment after she had talked to him, after she heard why he did 
it and why he didn't do it, after she had had a chance to consult with the 
school district's counsel. At that point in the calmness of her office, then she 
should indeed have known it. And she did testify that she had taken a mas-
ter's degree course in school law in which she studied Kuhlmeier and Fraser 
and Tinker. So--
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And so it should be perfectly clear to her ex-
actly what she could and couldn't do. 
MR. MERTZ: Yes. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: As it is to us, right? (Laughter.) 
JUSTICE SOUTER: I mean, we have a debate here for going on 50 minutes 
about what Tinker means, about the proper characterization of the behavior, 
the nonspeech behavior. The school's terms in dealing with the kids that 
morning. The meaning of that statement. We've been debating this in this 
courtroom for going on an hour, and it seems to me however you come out, 
there is reasonable debate. Should the teacher have known, even in the, in the 
calm deliberative atmosphere of the school later, what the correct answer is? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-49, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argumenctranscripts/06-278.pdf. 
The parties' briefs in Morse v. Frederick elaborate this doctrinal debate. Compare Brief for 
Petitioner 13-14, 20-21, 25-30, available at: http://www.abanet.orglpublicedlpreviewlbriefs/pdfs/ 
06-07/06-278]etitioner.pdf with Brief for Respondent 10-12, 17-21, available at: http://www. 
abanet.orglpublicedlpreviewlbriefs/pdfs/06-07/06-278_Respondent.pdf. See also the discussion 
about this issue throughout comments responding to Professor Eugene Volokh's post about the 
Morse v. Frederick case, at http://volokh.comlpostslI145577196.shtml (Apr. 20,2006). 
12 See Kathleen Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Some-
thing?, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1147, passim, 1211 (2002) (challenging the doctrinal private speech-
public speech dichotomy dividing students' speech and arguing for greater student speech rights, 
yet conceding that "[t]he public characteristics of this speech mean that schools should have some 
authority to ensure that the speech is appropriate to the occasion, civil and respectful of the 
speaker's audience, and consistent with the school's pedagogical objectives"). 
13 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2(06), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). 
HeinOnline -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  192 2007-2008
192 WEST VIRGINIA lA W REVIEW [Vol. 110 
sented this very issue. The Supreme Court declined to hear Harper during its 
2006 term, and the Ninth Circuit had decided the case on slightly different 
grounds. 14 Also during the 2006 term, though, the Supreme Court decided an-
other case involving student speech, Morse v. Frederick.ls The student speech 
in Morse was not religious: it consisted of a 14-foot paper banner on which 
crude block-letters apparently constructed from duct tape spelled out "BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS," a statement its student-author admits was intended to be non-
sensical.16 Because Morse is so self-limiting, it does not clarify much in the 
maze of student speech law-but it also does not close off the possibility that 
Supreme Court case law implicitly permits some viewpoint discrimination 
against religious and nonreligious speech in the public elementary and secon-
dary school context. 
Accordingly, the next section briefly reviews the limited application of 
Free Exercise Clause in the context of student religious T-shirt speech. The 
following section then turns to the Free Speech Clause and analyzes the doc-
trinal background for Morse as well as Morse itself, with particular attention to 
how Supreme Court cases arising out of the public elementary and secondary 
school setting have engaged or avoided the issue of viewpoint discrimination. 
Contrary to the often-held assumption and the conclusions of some circuits, I 
argue that the Court's four student speech cases can be read together as a body 
of law that permits schools to engage in limited viewpoint discrimination, al-
though the exact contours of this exception remain unclear .17 
14 Id. The Ninth Circuit's opinion focused on Tinker's rights of others prong, to the extent it 
considered Harper's free speech rights. 
This was certainly not the first time the Court passed up an opportunity to clarify the appli-
cability of the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses in public elementary and 
secondary schools. See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1110 (2003). 
15 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
16 Id. at 2618; Mark Walsh, Rights at Stake in Free-Speech Case, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 14,2007, 
at 1. 
17 In this article, I do not resolve the limits of such an exception although I assume infra at 
note 69 that such an exception does not permit intentional viewpoint discrimination in the absence 
of a constitutionally permissible reason for restricting the speech. In part, I reach thjs assumption 
because that is all my argument requires. Furthermore, what could be characterized as purposeful 
vicwpoint discrimination is not always invidious-a school that advocates tolerance of differences 
based on race, sex, sexual orientation, etc., seems on different footing than one quashing all 
speech in support of Republican political candidates and Republican-supported ballot initiatives, 
for example. Furthermore, the analysis of government purpose and constitutional implications of 
various purposes are complicated questions beyond the scope of this article. See generally Kristi 
L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer's Eyes: The Evolution-
Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 417 (2006) (examining the government 
purpose issue in the Establishment Clause context). John Taylor, who has authored a thoughtful 
companion piece to this one, Why Student Religious Speech is Speech, 110 W.VA. L. REv. 223 
(2007), examines this issue in detail in Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination (Nov. 5,2007) (un-
published manuscript, on file with WEST VIRGIN1A LAW REVIEW). 
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n. STUDENTS' RELIGIOUS SPEECH AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
Analyzing an individual student's religious speech-such as the mes-
sages on the T-shirts with which this article began-involves consideration not 
only of the Free Exercise Clause, but also of the Free Speech Clause. And, 
when the site of the constitutional conflict is a public elementary or secondary 
school and the rights-holders are schoolchildren, the contours of constitutional 
law sometimes vary significantly from the general constitutional rules. 18 This 
section discusses an area in which the doctrine does not vary: the Free Exercise 
Clause. The following section will turn to an area in which the variation is sub-
stantial and in which the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination is not en-
tirely clear: the Free Speech Clause. (Because it is significantly less likely that 
the Establishment Clause will come into play in student T-shirt religious speech 
cases, this article will not engage potential Establishment Clause issues in de-
tail. 19) 
Almost twenty years ago, the Court issued its noteworthy decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,20 
holding that if an individual identifies a law or governmental rule that conflicts 
with his or her religious belief or practice, the regulating governmental body is 
18 See supra note 10. 
19 See, e.g., Harper, 445 F.3d at 1190-91 (rejecting Harper's Establishment Clause claim un-
der the Lemon test and also under a coercion analysis). 
A potential Establishment Clause claim in this context could be brought by a third-party 
student: by permitting one student to wear a T-shirt with a particular religiously-based message, 
the school endorses that T-shirt, and thus the student's private action is transformed into unconsti-
tutional state action. The likelihood of success of this argument is low, primarily because Su-
preme Court and lower court cases have addressed reasonable third-party students' ability to dif-
ferentiate between the speech of a private actor (whether student, teacher, student organization, or 
community organization) and the speech of the school. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 
263,274-78 (1981); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) 
("The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated."); 
ld at 227. ("High school students are mature enough to and are likely to understand that a school 
does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."); 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001) ("[W]e have never extended our 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to foreclose private religious conduct during nonschool hours 
merely because it takes place on school premises where elementary school children may be pre-
sent."); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) ("The 
showing of this film series would not have been during school hours, would not have been spon-
sored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church members. The 
District property had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations. Under these 
circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger that the community would 
think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or 
to the Church would have been no more than incidental."). The argument becomes marginally 
stronger if an ill-defined critical mass of students are all wearing the same shirt; stronger if the T-
shirt has the school name and a slogan that the school could reasonably appear to have approved; 
and perhaps strongest yet when the "speech" involves an exception to the school rules, such as the 
Day of Silence. 
20 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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not required to grant any exemption if the law or rule is one of general applica-
bility.21 Furthermore, the government may not specifically target religion or 
religious practice.22 If a free exercise claim is presented in concert with another 
constitutional claim,23 courts should view the duo as a "hybrid rights" claim and 
ensure that the government's refusal to accommodate the individual's religious 
belief or practice can survive strict scrutiny.24 When the hybrid framework is 
triggered, as it necessarily will be in student religious speech cases,25 the test 
applicable to an individual's free exercise claim changes in such a way that the 
student's claim has a better (though perhaps still only slim) chance of succeed-
ing, as compared to a non-hybrid "pure" free exercise claim.26 
Several scholars who have written about Smith argue that despite the 
substantial changes Smith made to the face of free exercise doctrine, Smith had a 
comparatively small impact on the actual results of free exercise cases because 
21 See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 8, at 96; Tushnet, supra note 8, at 71. 
22 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
23 The Free Exercise claim can be linked to one of many other rights but appears to be most 
often connected to a parent's liberty interest in directing the upbringing of his child, a child's free 
speech claim. William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise 
Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 238 (1998); Marie Elise 
Lasso, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the State of Free Ex-
ercise Doctrine, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 569,596-97 (1993). 
24 Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
25 Smith was a criminal case, but courts generally agree that it applies in both the civil and 
criminal contexts-and thus it applies to Free Exercise claims arising out of situations implicating 
public schools. Jeremy Meyer, Ratchet Plus? Possible Constitutional Foundations for the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343, 351 n.51 
(1995) (collecting cases). Religious speech claims could be at the very least a combination of 
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause claims. As in Harper, a claim also could involve allega-
tions of the violation of the Establishment Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection 
Clause, and various state law claims. 
26 See generally, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 
(2007). At least fifteen states have stronger free exercise standards through state legislative or 
judicial determinations. Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public 
Schools: The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. 
L.REv. 2209, 2213-14 nn.3l-32 (2005) (collecting twelve such state statutory citations and three 
such case citations). 
Circuits are split on the issue of the necessary strength of the two independent components 
of hybrid claims. The Second and Sixth Circuits seem to disregard the hybrid rights doctrine. The 
First and D.C. Circuits recognize hybrid claims only if both are independently viable, while the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits will recognize hybrid claims if both component claims are colorable. 
Ryan M. Akers, Note, Begging the High Court for Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 17 REGENT U. L. REV'. 77 (2004) (collecting case citations); Michael E. 
Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid 
Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L.REv. 2209, 2221-34 (2005) (collect-
ing case citations). 
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the doctrine already was weak and/or inconsistently applied.27 Detractors and 
defenders of Smith alike have criticized its reasoning as well as its result, agree-
ing that Smith further limited the ability of the Free Exercise Clause to protect 
religious exercise and speech?8 One scholar's unforgiving description is repre-
sentative of many others', characterizing the Free Exercise Clause as "virtually 
meaningless both within and outside of schools.,,29 The four student religious 
27 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION, 44-45 (Harv. Univ. Press 2007) ("In 1990 five justices surveyed this string of 
precedents and [in Smith] stated the obvious-that although the Court had long given lip service 
to Sherbert's compelling state interest test, it had never applied it faithfully and, what is more, 
could not possibly do so."); William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality? An Assess-
ment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 
IND. L.J. 193,195-96 (2000) ("[N]obody argues that Smith signaled a major change in the results 
of free exercise cases. Sherbert's compelling interest test had never been given much vitality by 
the Court, and its doctrinal abandonment in Smith simply echoed the actual results in cases" (cit-
ing Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems and Burdens on the Free Exercise of Relig-
ion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933,944 (1989))). However, one social science article concluded that 
"[t]he odds of a favorable decision for religious freedom cases were approximately two to one for 
those periods separated from Smith." That study measured outcomes during three timeframes: 
January 1981-April 1990 before Smith, April 1990-December 1993, and then December 1993-
January 1997 under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. John Wybraniec & Roger 
Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: The Judiciary's Changing Role in Protecting Minor-
ity Religions from Majoritarian Rule, 40 J. FOR SCI. STUDY OF RELIG. 427,438 (2001). 
28 As part of an article in which he asked whether the Free Exercise Clause after Smith was 
entirely (or just almost entirely) redundant, Professor Mark Tushnet noted that, "the present scope 
of the Free Exercise Clause ... is quite small." Tushnet, supra note 8, at 72. For further com-
ments on this point, see, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and 
Why?, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 95, 112, 115 (2001) ("In the context of speech and expressive associa-
tion, the Free Speech Clause may playa more affirmative role in fostering constitutional protec-
tion for religion. In particular, it appears that religion is accorded a preferred status in the Court's 
free speech doctrine, and the same may be true for expressive association") (The Free Exercise 
Clause is independent of the Free Speech Clause in that it "may provide at least a small amount of 
non-redundant constitutional shelter for the institutional autonomy of religious organizations."). 
See also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION VOLUME I: FREE EXERCISE 
AND FAIRNESS, 76-85 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensi-
ble Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 925, 929 (2000) (After Smith, the Free Exer-
cise Clause no longer retains an independent function when compared to the other First Amend-
ment clauses.); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. I (1990); 
Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 
BYU L. REV. 259, 260-61, n.9 (collecting a sample of such criticism in the two years following 
the Smith decision); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 
(1992). 
Soon after Smith, George Dent summarized the results of Free Exercise controversies as 
follows: "When accommodation is denied, some parents sue. Reported opinions in these cases are 
few and the results are inconsistent. Parents usually (though not always) win an exemption from 
offensive instruction, but rarely gain any further relief." George W. Dent, Of God and Caesar: 
The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 707 (1993). 
29 Ryan, supra note 10, at 1388. See articles cited supra note 28. Steven W. Fitschen, Presi-
dent of the National Legal Foundation and an Instructor at Regent University School of Law, has 
explained the reasoning and intentionality of reframing free exercise cases as free speech cases 
and, retrospectively, how this was a mistake for conservative advocates of religious liberty princi-
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T -shirt cases decided by federal courts seem consistent with this evaluation: in 
two, the student tried to bring a free exercise claim and failed,3o and in two the 
student did not even raise a free exercise claim.31 This is not to suggest that 
these students should have prevailed under the Free Exercise Clause,32 but rather 
to illustrate that religious speech claims have more potential for success under 
the Free Speech Clause (which applies the same rules to religious and non-
religious speech).33 
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court has not employed a dis-
tinct free exercise standard for students' religious exercise and speech in public 
elementary and secondary schools and there is little reason to think it would do 
pies. Steven W. Fitschen, Religion in the Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent School Dis-
trict v. Doe: Timefor a New Strategy, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 433, 435-44 (2001). 
Interestingly, many legal scholars in other countries view the Establishment Clause as the 
"useless" one of the Religion Clauses because of its extensive doctrinal discord. Many other 
countries' constitutions and international treaties do not have a parallel to our Establishment 
Clause, although nearly all have a Free Speech Clause. Often, it is assumed that a free exercise-
type clause can do the work of the United States' Free Exercise Clause as well as its Establish-
ment Clause. Kent Greenawalt, Moral and Religious Convictions as Categories for Special 
Treatment: The Exemption Strategy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1605, 1633 (2007); Mark Modak-
Turan, Reenchanting International Law, 22 MISS. C. L. REv. 263, 291 (2003). 
30 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S.Ct. 1484 (2007); 
Zamecnik ex rei. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
17, 2007). This article assumes that the district courts applied the law properly and does not con-
tend that the students should have been able to prevail under current law. 
31 Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (S.D. Ohio 2005); K.D. 
v. Fillmore Central School Dist., 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,2005). 
It appears that the small universe of recent, post-Smith student religious speech cases may 
include not-insignificant variations of the free exercise test. For example, in two religious jew-
elry/appearance cases where students' religious speech ultimately was protected, the court did not 
engage in a particularly exacting free exercise analysis or employ a standard that demanded much 
of the student. See, e.g., Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trustees of the Big Sandy In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319,1329 (E.D. Tex. 1993); Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997). In contrast, courts applied Free Exercise tests that de-
manded more of the students (and thus were more consistent with Smith) in two situations where 
students' religious speech ultimately was unprotected under the Free Exercise Clause (one of 
these was aT-shirt case, the other involved a student's attempts to have her religious viewpoint 
represented on a panel about homosexuality during Diversity Week). Harper, 445 F.3d at 1188; 
Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 808-09 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Perhaps the 
students in Harper, Nixon, K.D. and 2amecnik might have prevailed on a Free Exercise claim 
under some of these tests. See also Professor Taylor's discussion of these cases, supra note 17, at 
n.4. 
32 In the companion piece to this article, Professor John Taylor argues convincingly that the 
dominance of the Free Speech Clause to the exclusion of the Free Exercise Clause in what would 
otherwise be characterized as hybrid-rights situations is "a matter of constitutional principle." 
Taylor, supra note 17, at 224. 
33 See generally William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With Equality?: An Assessment of 
the Equal Treatment of Religion and Non-religion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 
193 (2000). 
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SO.34 The Court's two notable cases involving free exercise rights arising out of 
the public elementary and secondary school setting both are consistent with 
Smith. The first, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, decided in 
1943 without use of a clear test, is often characterized as a free speech case, 
although it presents what would likely now be characterized as a hybrid free 
speech/free exercise claim and thus today would receive the same heightened 
level of scrutiny as in the original decision.35 The second, Yoder,36 decided in 
1972, is consistent with Smith because the Court took pains to explicitly ac-
commodate its holding in Smith, at least facially. 37 
Thus, it is the Free Speech Clause that is the focus of this article about 
students' religious speech, and to which we now tum. 
III. THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE AND RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 
IN SCHOOLS 
[T]he Court in Tinker held that a school may prohibit student 
speech, even if the consequence is viewpoint discrimination, if 
the speech violates the rights of other students or is materially 
disruptive. 
- Ninth Circuit, 200638 
[T]here is no indication [in Hazelwood, decided 19 years after 
Tinker] that the Court intended to drastically rewrite First 
Amendment law to allow a school official to discriminate based 
on a speaker's views. 
- Eleventh Circuit, 198939 
Free speech decisions arising out of the public school context have been 
responsive to the purposes of public education~urricular instruction, civic 
preparation, and socialization-and also to the practical constraints of the edu-
cational setting.4o Because of this, the three core student speech cases before 
Morse-Tinker,41 Fraser,42 and Hazelwootf3-are, in Professor James Ryan's 
34 The factors considered as part of the free exercise analysis (e.g., what constitutes a compel-
ling governmental interest?) may differ somewhat when applied to public schoolchildren as op-
posed to adults, or to a non-educational environment. Ryan, supra note 10, at 1388. 
35 Compare Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) with Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of 
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). See also Ryan, supra note 10. 
36 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
37 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82; see also Ryan, supra note 10. 
38 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1184 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 




Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1989). 
See supra note 10. 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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words, "more deferential to school authorities than ... standards that apply in 
other contexts and to other government officials.,,44 As the circuit split45 illus-
trated by the excerpts immediately above reveals, none of the Court's now-four 
student speech cases make clear whether such deference also tacitly permits 
school officials to discriminate among students' expressed individual view-
points in public elementary and secondary schools during the school day.46 
Thus, the default assumption often has been that the Court's facially unequivo-
cal statements generally prohibiting viewpoint discrimination in other contexts 
applied to student speech.47 Yet, this assumption does not square with the 
Court's departures from generally-applicable free speech doctrine in the unique 
context of public elementary and secondary schools.48 
Accordingly, this section first briefly describes the factual and doctrinal 
importance of focusing on students' religious T-shirt speech. Next, it examines 
the Court's three foundational student speech cases, arguing that even though 
they do not address the issue of viewpoint discrimination directly, these cases 
have implications for the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination in the stu-
dent T-shirt speech situations. Then, it turns to two of the Court's overt view-





Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
Ryan, supra note 10, at 1359. 
45 See cases and discussion cited infra note 110. See generally Emily Gold Waldman, Return-
ing to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, FLA. L. 
REv. (forthcoming 2008). 
46 See infra Sections III.B. and III.D; see also Waldman, supra note 45. 
47 See, e.g., Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and 
Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1017, 1037-38 (1995); Lisa Shaw Roy, Incul-
cation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 647, 648, passim 
(2005); Harper, 445 F.3d at 1201 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("I have considerable difficulty with 
giving school authorities the power to decide that only one side of a controversial topic may be 
discussed in the school environment because the opposing point of view is too extreme or de-
meaning. As Judge Gilman said in his dissent in Boroffv. Van Wert City Board of Education, 220 
F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000), '[S]chool officials are not free to decide that only one side of a topic is 
open for discussion because the other side is too repugnant or demoralizing to listen to.' Id. at 474 
(Gilman, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). I couldn't have said it better."); Peck v. 
Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 632 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 
1314, 1319, 1325 (11th CiT. 1989); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 1999). 
48 Ryan, supra note 10, at 1359. "For one set of rights, involving the Free Speech Clause, Due 
Process Clause, and Fourth Amendment, the Court is willing to defer to education officials, with 
the caveat that the policies that intrude upon these rights without furthering an academic goal will 
not be tolerated. For the second set of rights, involving Equal Protection, Establishment, and Free 
Exercise Clauses, the Court is unwilling to defer to education officials, with the caveat that poli-
cies that intrude upon these rights in order to further an academic goal may well be tolerated. 
With regard to each set of rights, however, the dispositive question--does the challenged policy 
advance an academic goal-appears to remain the same." Id. at 1417. 
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A. How T-shirt Speech Differs from Other Speech 
Among student religious speech situations (student prayer, distribution 
of materials, religious jewelry, student organization recognition and use of 
school facilities, et cetera) the T-shirt speech situations are uniquely focused: 
this type of speech has a specific message;49 it is the students' speech and not 
their parents' ;50 the speech occurs during the school day on school premises and 
in what I will assume is a closed forum;51 it is speech of an individual nature 
with a low likelihood of being perceived as the speech of the school;52 it is not 
49 The speech in Tinker conveyed a specific message: I oppose the war in Vietnam. The mes-
sages conveyed on the T-shirts also are specific: "Homosexuality is a sin," "Islam is a lie," etc. 
This is in contrast to the message conveyed by religious jewelry, which, if intended to convey any 
message, loosely affiliates the wearer with a faith tradition. See, e.g., Chalifoux v. New Caney 
Indep. Sch. Dis!., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
50 The Court has noted repeatedly that children have constitutional rights independent of their 
parents' rights, even if children must bring suit through their parents to satisfy procedural re-
quirements. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dis!. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15-18 (2004); Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dis!., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dis!. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dis!. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). And, "[t]he psy-
chological evidence suggests that even relatively young children can have personally meaningful 
religious beliefs that, from a cognitive perspective, do not differ dramatically from those of 
adults." Note, Children as Believers: Minors' Free Exercise Rights and the Psychology of Reli-
gious Development, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2205,2226 (2002). Therefore, the Pierce, Meyer, Yoder 
·line of cases involving parental liberty rights is not applicable and a debate over whether the claim 
is the parent's right or the student's right does not need to occur. See generally Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972); id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Emily Buss, What 
Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53,67-68 (2000). 
51 Engaging in forum analysis raises issues beyond the scope of this article and is a step courts 
seem to rarely take in cases involving student speech such as messages on T-shirts. See, e.g., 
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dis!., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2004), affd, 445 F.3d 1166 
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as 
moot, 127 S. C!. 1484 (2007); Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 
2005); Zamecnik ex. rei Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dis!. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 17, 2007); Sypnewski v. Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Furthermore, of the 
Supreme Court's four student speech cases (including Morse), only one-Hazelwood--explicitIy 
engages in a forum analysis. Forum analysis is more appropriate in situations where religious 
student or community organizations seek to use public school premises on the same terms as non-
religious organizations and thus a school may have intentionally created a limited public forum. 
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Com. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990); Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
274-76 (1981). 
Last but certainly not least, Professor Taylor's article sets forth three specific reasons why 
the forum analysis doctrine finds a particularly ill fit in elementary and secondary public schools. 
Taylor, supra note 17, at 233-35; see also Jay Alan Sekulow et aI., Proposed Guidelines for Stu-
dent Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1031-37 
(1995). 
52 This is in direct contrast to situations involving prayer at school-sponsored events such as 
football games, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), or graduation ceremonies, 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). This also is in contrast to speech that can be perceived as 
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speech that requires other students to respond in order to disassociate them-
selves from the message;53 it is speech that may as easily occur at school as at 
other locations rather than speech (such as a school assignment) that must by 
definition occur in the school setting and which could incur penalties of an aca-
demic nature;54 and the posture of any resulting case is that the school has re-
stricted speech.55 Practically speaking, it is similar to speech contained on but-
school-sponsored, such as the school newspaper situation in Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
See also my discussion of this issue supra note 10. 
53 In situations of group practice such as a spoken prayer at graduation or classroom recitation 
of the pledgc of allegiance, silence and similar action on the part of one individual (e.g. standing 
when everyone else stands) often suggests acceptance of the message. Action noticeably different 
from the norm is needed to demonstrate disagreement with the message. See, e.g., Lee v. Weis-
man, 505 U.S. 577, 590-92, 593 (1992). Similarly, when materials are distributed in school, some 
response is required from a receiving student-to take the flyer or pass the stack of flyers along to 
the next student. See, e.g., Thompson by Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 
1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Johnston-Loehner v. O'Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1994). In 
contrast, students who disagree with another's T-shirt must not do anything to disassociate them-
selves with its message, for they are not associated with it in the first place, and similarly, they are 
not put in a position of needing to manifest agreement or disagreement. See Christina Engstrom 
Martin, Student-Initiated Religious Expression After Mergens and Weisman, Note, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 1565, 1580-81 (1994). 
54 This is in contrast to situations in which a student is not permitted to complete an assign-
ment by writing or presenting about a religious topic. See, e.g., Curry v. Sch. Dist. of the City of 
Saginaw, 452 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2006); DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 
744 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Kathleen A. Brady, 
The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 
1147, 1178, 1182 (2002); Chad Allred, Guarding the Treasure: Protection of Student Speech in 
the Classroom, 22 SEATfLE U. L. REv. 741 (1999); Lisa C. Shaw, Student-Initiated Religious 
Speech, the Classroom, and the First Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Should Have Granted 
Review in Settle v. Dickinson County School Board, 18 PACE L. REV. 255 (1998). In those situa-
tions, a student might be given a lower grade on the assignment. When students are suspended or 
expelled from school, school policy sometimes permits them to make up work missed during the 
suspension or expulsion and receive full or partial credit for it, so the discipline does not necessar-
ily result in the double penalty of a resulting academic handicap. Compare Capistrano Unified 
School District, San Juan Capistrano, California, available at http://www.capousd.orglboard% 
20policies/6154.PDF; Niles West High School, Niles Illinois, available at http://www.niles-
hs.kI2.il.us/danrus/Rusk-AP _Calc_AB.pdf; Greenfield High School, Greenfield, Wisconsin, 
http://www.greenfield.kI2.wi.us/display/router.asp?docid=1981. with Charlie Crist, Florida At-
torney General, Advisory Legal Opinion No. AGO 2004-56 (Nov. 23, 2004), available at 
http://myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/C922A50 1 B070CC5685256F550077 45EE. 
55 Consider the prayer at graduation cases and other cases brought primarily to contest alleged 
Establishment Clause violations; in these situations, the school will most often affirmatively have 
allowed an action or event that is disputed. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Lassonde v. 
Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2001), 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 
2003); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000); Harris v. Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993),41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert granted, judg-
ment vacated, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995), case remanded because moot, 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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tons although the comparatively larger size of aT-shirt presents a greater likeli-
hood of actually communicating a message to others.56 
As such, the religious speech T-shirt situations present scenarios that in 
many ways are quite similar to the Tinker black armband Vietnam protest sce-
nario, and thus the competing interests are fairly familiar: on one side are the 
public schools seeking to fulfill their basic educational function and correspond-
ing obligation to the now forty-nine million public school students57 who pass 
through the proverbial schoolhouse gates each day.58 On the other side are stu-
dents who are engaging in speech that may be particularly disruptive to the 
school environment because of the viewpoint of the religiously-based message 
being conveyed. 59 
B. Before Morse: The Student Speech Trilogy 
In 2007, Morse became the fourth case decided by the Supreme Court to 
focus on the restriction of public elementary and secondary students' speech. 
Tinker commonly is considered the default standard,6o with Fraser and Hazel-
wood creating two specific exceptions and Morse now a third.61 
1. Tinker's Disruptiveness, and the Rights of Others 
Tinker has been called the "high water mark" of student speech rights.62 
This section discusses its two legal standards. 
a. Material and Substantial Disruption 
The test for which Tinker is well-known and oft-cited is that student 
speech may be restricted if it "materially and substantially interfere[s]"63 with 
"the requirements of appropriate discipline,,64 or "schoolwork," or if such inter-
56 Professor Taylor also notes that the T-shirt situations are more likely to give rise to contro-
versy and ultimately cases because T-shirts are "more likely to be detected by school officials and 
harder for students to avoid than verbal remarks outside the classroom." Taylor, supra note 17, at 
n.4. 
57 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, FAST 
FACTS (2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=65. 
58 Accord Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
59 Id. 
60 Scholars have questioned Tinker's continuing viability. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 
7. 
61 Trotter, supra note 6 at 20-23; Linda Greenhouse, Court Hears Whether a Drug Statement 
is Protected Free Speech/or Students, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,2007, at A16. 
62 Numerous scholars and commentators use this term to describe Tinker. See, e.g., Benjamin 
Dowling-Sendor, Nuisance and Nonsense, 191 AM. SCH. BD. J. (Mar. 2004). 
63 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th Cir. 1966». 
64 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
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ference is reasonably anticipated by school officials.65 Giving shape to this test, 
the Court stated that "the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany 
an unpopular viewpoint,,66 would not create a level of disruption sufficient to 
justify restricting the speech. The Court explained further that "the prohibition 
of expression of one particular opinion" is not permissible absent such a disrup-
tion or reasonable anticipation thereof.67 Tinker never explicitly stated whether 
viewpoint discrimination was permissible under the facially neutral purpose of 
suppressing speech significantly disruptive to the educational environment.68 
However, the focus of the disruption test and the Court's subsequent language 
clarifying that test are consistent with the idea that one particular perspective 
could cause a level and type of disruption sufficient to justify quashing it in 
what would amount to viewpoint discrimination, even if other perspectives on 





Id. at 509,510. 
[d. at 509. 
[d. at 511, 513. 
68 This has not stopped some courts from seeing definitive language in Tinker regarding the 
permissibility of viewpoint discrimination. Harper v. Poway, 445 F.3d 1166, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006) 
("Indeed, the Court in Tinker held that a school may prohibit student speech, even if the conse-
quence is viewpoint discrimination, if the speech violates the rights of other students or is materi-
ally disruptive."), cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as 
moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 
2004) (Tinker "applies to school regulations directed at specific student viewpoints" (citing Ca-
nady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2001))). 
69 To be clear: this language would seem to permit viewpoint discrimination only to the extent 
that a particular viewpoint satisfies the disruption standard, not necessarily to the extent that a 
school administrator disagrees with the student's viewpoint or finds the viewpoint inconsistent 
with the school's message or mission. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 513. See generally Taylor, supra 
note 17. 
Petitioner Morse in Morse v. Frederick presented this interpretation of Tinker as well. Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief at 15, available at http://www.abanet.orglpublicedlpreviewlbriefs/pdfs/06-
07/06-278_PetitionerReply.pdf; see also Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2007 WL 880748, at *7-9 (Mar. 
19,2007). 
In a blog post on The Volokh Conspiracy about Morse, Professor Eugene Volokh com-
mented, 
[S]ometimes speech that's hostile based on race, religion, or sexual orienta-
tion-as well as speech that offends people for a wide variety of other rea-
sons-might indeed lead to substantial disruption. But this is at least a fa-
cially viewpoint-neutral standard that potentially applies to speech on all per-
spectives, and doesn't categorically cast out certain viewpoints from First 
Amendment protection. While the standard isn't without its problems, it is at 
least basically consistent with the First Amendment principle of "equality of 
status in the field of ideas." 
Eugene Volokh, Sorry, Your Viewpoint is Excludedfrom First Amendment Protection, available 
at http://volokh.comlposts/1145577196.shtml (Apr. 20, 2006). 
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Simply stated, some viewpoints are more disruptive than others.70 Spe-
cifically, some religious viewpoints can be more disruptive than other religious 
or secular viewpoints about the same topic. Predicting whether a given message 
will create a substantial and material disruption in a particular school can be 
difficult even for an administrator in that school who knows its history and is 
familiar with the student body. For an outsider to try to make a factual judg-
ment about the reasonableness of the administrator's view in a situation where 
context matters so substantially is even more challenging, thus it may not be 
surprising that courts vary in their deference to administrators' determinations 
on this latter topic,7! especially if the disruption anticipated by the administrator 
was not borne out. 
Because of the highly fact-specific nature of these situations, looking to 
reported cases for indications of which statements might or might not cause a 
substantial and material disruption is only minimally helpful. Three of the four 
federal district courts to evaluate student religious T-shirt speech cases engaged 
in the Tinker disruption analysis: Harper v. Poway, Nixon v. Northern Local 
School District, and K.D. v. Fillmore Central School District. Avoiding Tinker, 
the Seventh Circuit in Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District read circuit 
law to require a different analysis.72 The district courts in Harper, Nixon, and 
K.D. all found that the T-shirts in question did not or would not have constituted 
Some view Tinker as rejecting a school policy that was viewpoint-based because it prohib-
ited black armbands only. For example, in its online Education Policy Issue Site available as a 
resource for educators, the Education Commission of the States writes, "Central to the court's 
decision [in Tinker] was the fact that the policy was "viewpoint-specific" and did not ban other 
clothing that expressed controversial views, including Iron Crosses, often seen as symbols of 
Hitler and the Nazis. This aspect of the decision is consistent with a number of later Supreme 
Court decisions signaling that viewpoint-specific dress restrictions violate the First Amendment." 
Education Commission of the States, UnifonnslDress Codes, ECS Education Policy Issue Site, 
available at http://www.ecs.orglhtmllIssueSection.asp?issueid=145&s=Overview. But, others 
argue more generally that Tinker policy was content-based. See, e.g., Memorandum for United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs Motion to Preliminary Injunction at n.5, Westfield 
High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. Westfield Pub. Sch., No. 03-30008 (Feb. 19,2003). 
70 West v. Derby, 206 F. 1358 (10th Cir. 2000) (Confederate flag images prohibited under 
school policy; prohibition was constitutional). See also Rutherford Institute, Teaching Public 
Schools the ABCs of the Constitution-Part II, Students' Free Speech Rights in Public Schools, 
(Aug. 13,2003), available at http://www.rutherjord.org/. 
71 See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972-74 (S.D. Ohio 
2005) (concluding that the school officials did not satisfy the "reasonable anticipation" test in the 
case before it and reviewing other courts' applications of this test); but see Harper v. Poway Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1171-72, n.6 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (the district court did hold 
that previous events had given rise to reasonable anticipation of substantial or material disruption 
and although the appellate court also reached the conclusion that Harper's speech could be barred 
under Tinker, it based its decision on another aspect of Tinker), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 
case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot. This is not to say that courts should defer 
entirely to school administrators' decisions across the board or to assume that all administrators 
operate in good faith. 
72 Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 969-74; Harper, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Zamecnik ex reI. 
Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17,2007). 
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a material and substantial disruption under Tinker.73 Harper's T-shirt, quoted at 
the beginning of this article, stated on the front: "BE ASHAMED! OUR 
SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED," and on the back: 
"HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL Romans 1:27."74 Nixon's T-shirt bore 
the message "INTOLERANT! Jesus said ... I am the way, the truth and the 
life'! John 14:6" on the front, and on the back it said, "Homosexuality is a sin!! 
Islam is a lie!! Abortion is murder!! Some issues are just black and white!,,75 
K.D.' s T-shirt, also quoted at the beginning of this article, read on the front 
"ABORTION IS HOMICIDE" and on the back "YOU WILL NOT SILENCE 
MY MESSAGE! YOU WILL NOT MOCK MY GOD! YOU WILL STOP 
KILLING MY GENERATION! ROCK FOR LIFE!" (Zamecnik's T-shirt con-
tained the phrase "Be Happy, Not Gay.,,76) The consistent findings in Harper, 
Nixon, and K.D. could seem to suggest that T-shirts with these or similar mes-
sages are unlikely ever to be sufficiently disruptive to permit their censorship 
under Tinker. This might be the case, but speculating about the degree to which 
the reactions of these school communities are representative of other schools' 
reactions to these same anti-gay and anti-abortion statements would be unwise. 
Generally, though, it is plausible that these statements could cause substantially 
more disruption in some schools, especially those with a history of conflict 
about the issues implicated by the T-shirt speech,77 and less in others. 
Furthermore, these three students' T-shirts probably would not be the 
most controversial of all available student religious T-shirts in many communi-
ties. A 2005 survey by Government Professor James L. Gibson and Marc Mo-
jore Howard evaluated antipathy towards Communists, atheists, radical Mus-
lims, and religious (presumably Christian) fundamentalists.78 Atheists were 
disliked to some degree by 79.6% of respondents, closely followed by radical 
Muslims at 78.5%, and Communists at 73.4%. Only 39.1 % of respondents ex-
pressed any level of dislike toward religious fundamentalists.79 Extrapolating 
Gibson and Howard's findings to the context discussed in this article suggests 
that in many communities across the United States, student speech promoting 
atheism or Islam (or speech that clearly is motivated by an atheist or a Muslim 
perspective) might create more disruption than the speech on the T-shirts dis-
cussed in this article. 
73 Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Harper, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. 
74 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171, cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions 
to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). 
75 Nixon, 383 F. Supp.2d at 967. 
76 Zamecnik, 2007 WL 1141597, at * 1. 
77 See, e.g., West v. Derby, 206 F.3d 1358, 1362-63, 1366-67 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
78 James L. Gibson, Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half-Century 
After McCarthyism (Working Paper No. 20, Jan. 9, 2007), available at hUp:/Ipolisci.wustl.edul 
media/download.php?page=faculty&paper=85. 
79 Id. 
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Additionally, it is important to recognize that speech overtly critical of a 
particular faith tradition may be perceived with more hostility by those within 
that faith tradition than those outside it. Consider, for example, the caricatures 
of Mohammed printed in a Danish newspaper in September 2005.80 It would 
not be difficult for someone unfamiliar with the Islamic faith tradition to recog-
nize the cartoons as mocking Islam, but many Muslims considered the cartoons 
to rise far beyond offense to the level of blasphemy.81 Thus a T-shirt carrying a 
similar cartoon might generate a few raised eyebrows and disapproving glances 
in a school with no Islamic students (possible discomfort), but worn in a school 
with a portion of its population Muslim, the reaction could be much more severe 
(potentially substantial and material disruption). Depending on what other stu-
dent speech was allowed, such a restriction easily could create an instance of 
viewpoint discrimination. 
b. Rights of Others 
The second and even more nebulous test from Tinker-and one almost 
never determinative-is that one student's speech may not "collid[e] with" or 
"inva[de]" the rights of other students; if it does, it may be prohibited.82 Harper 
v. Poway from the Ninth Circuit and Saxe v. State College Area School Dis-
trict83 from the Third Circuit are directly at odds as to the meaning of this aspect 
of Tinker, 84 with significant consequence. If this test has independent meaning, 
80 See http://www.brusselsjournal.comlnode/698 (containing the cartoons and a short summary 
of the conflict). 
81 Michael Slackman, Iran Exhibits Anti-Jewish Art as Reply to Danish Cartoons, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2006, at A8. 
82 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,513 (1969). The decision in 
Hazelwood sidestepped the opportunity to define this test further. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.5 (1988). In dissent in Hazelwood, Justice Brennan wrote in 
reference to this test that "[i]f that term is to have any content, it must be limited to rights that are 
protected by law. 'Any yardstick less exacting than [that] could result in school officials curtail-
ing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance .... '" Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (8th Cir. 1986». See also David L. 
Hudson, Tinkering with Tinker Standards? First Amendment Center, Aug. 9, 2006, available at 
http://www .firstamendmentcenter.orglanal ysis.aspx ?id= 17253. 
83 Saxe v. State Coil. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
84 In Harper, the Ninth Circuit described Harper's anti-gay speech as falling into an unpro-
tected category of speech that constitutes a "verbal assault [on other students] on the basis of a 
core identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation." Harper, 445 F.3d at 
1178. 
In Saxe, now-Justice Alito rejected this idea of a harassment exception, writing for the panel 
that "a wide variety of speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive, including statements 
that impugn another's race or national origin or that denigrate religious beliefs" may not be pro-
hibited under Tinker. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206. 
In an amicus brief filed at the district court level in another case, the United States argued: 
"The mere fact that school administrators believe that certain speech may offend other students is 
insufficient to censor speech. This is as true with speech expressing a religious viewpoint that 
HeinOnline -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  206 2007-2008
206 WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 110 
as the Ninth Circuit concluded that it did in an opinion later vacated because the 
underlying case had become moot, restricting student speech under Tinker's ill-
defined second test could be notably easier for schools than restricting the same 
speech under the material and substantial disruption test, especially because 
religious beliefs often are central to an individual's identity and thus a particu-
larly sensitive subject.85 
The potential practical effects the Ninth Circuit's approach would have 
on viewpoint discrimination against religious speech are unclear, however. 
First, let us set aside for a moment the presumption prohibiting viewpoint dis-
crimination. If individuals more likely to be the target of aggressive speech are 
those in the minority in that community,86 then viewpoints critical of minority 
groups (as in Harper) may be more frequently restricted under this test than 
viewpoints critical of majority groups, although the same general rule would 
apply to all speech. However, cases and anecdotes suggest that the "minority 
groups" that would be the target of aggressive religious speech probably would 
include gays and lesbians, women who do not ascribe to traditional gender roles, 
Muslims, Jews, Christian fundamentalists, and others.87 Thus, the "rights of 
others" test from Tinker easily could prohibit religious speech from a wide vari-
ety of political, social, and religious viewpoints. And, although majority groups 
may not be targeted as frequently or affected in the same way by aggressive 
speech focusing on them, majority groups certainly are not immune from criti-
cism and thus also could be protected under this aspect of Tinker. Therefore, 
depending on how the "rights of others" concept is defined, Tinker's second test 
could have a very broad effect. But, before Tinker's second test fills school 
principals' offices across the country with students wearing T-shirts with mildly 
critical messages, it is worth remembering the discomfort/disruption distinction 
from Tinker's first test and applying that principle to Tinker's second test. 
On the other hand, if a presumptive requirement of viewpoint neutrality 
trumps this aspect of Tinker, as the Third Circuit suggested, then the "rights of 
others" test would lose most, if not all, of the independent effect the Ninth Cir-
cuit would give it. If the school permitted speech in support of gay and lesbian 
students, as it did in Harper, the school could not prohibit Tyler Harper's "Ho-
mosexuality is shameful" T-shirt, no matter what internal effect it might have on 
may make some students uncomfortable as it is with any other viewpoint that others may find 
unsettling." Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, No. 03-30008 (filed Feb. 19, 
2003). 
85 Daniel Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 
1113,1164-65 (1988). 
86 See generally FRANK RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION (1999); Philip Glea-
son, Minorities (Almost) All: The Minority Concept in American Social Thought, 43 AM. Q. 392 
(1991). 
87 See sources cited supra note 4; see also Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178; Nixon v. N. Local Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Zamecnik ex reI. Zamecnik v. Indian 
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17,2007). 
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other students.88 Harper's T-shirt and others like it only could be prohibited if 
their messages were phrased in a vulgar or obscene manner, thus implicating 
Fraser, or violated Tinker's first prong.89 Religious and non-religious speech 
intruding on the rights of others would need to be permitted in nearly all cir-
cumstances.90 
Thus, Tinker's silence on how its two tests fit with the principle of 
viewpoint neutrality has created confusion. But, it is clear that giving full effect 
either to Tinker's first, well-known "substantial and material disruption" test or 
to the second more obscure "rights of others" test inevitably requires some 
viewpoint discrimination to occur, although the two tests implicate viewpoint 
discrimination in slightly different ways. 
2. Fraser's Lewd, Crude, and Otherwise Out-of-Line Criteria 
The second of the student free speech cases, Fraser, involved a high 
school student who delivered a short speech filled with sexual innuendo at an 
all-school assembly when he nominated a classmate for student body vice-
president. The Court in Fraser did not apply a clear, singular test,91 although 
the case generally is cited for the principle that students' speech is not protected 
if its manner is "vulgar," "lewd," or "plainly offensive.,,92 Fraser also added to 
the doctrine the idea that the school could restrict the speech at issue in large 
part because such speech contravened the school's "basic educational mission" 
of creating the next generation of citizens, and the school district was the appro-
priate body to define its own mission.93 
About fifteen years after Fraser was decided, its principles came into 
play in what arguably could be characterized as a fifth student religious T-shirt 
case, albeit one of a very different sort than Harper, Nixon, Zamecnik, or K.D. 
In Boroffv. Van Wert City Board of Education, Nicholas Boroff was prohibited 
from wearing "Marilyn Manson" T-shirts to schoo1.94 On the front of one of the 
T-shirts, a picture of a three-headed Jesus appeared along with the words "See 
88 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1192-1207 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
89 See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
90 Only rare exceptions may exist and if so they are likely to occur as violations of existing 
anti-harassment law, such as the provisions of Title VII, that have been interpreted to hold schools 
liable for student-on-student sexual harassment in certain circumstances. See Davis v. Monroe 
County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640-44 (1999) (setting forth the criteria for when schools 
become liable for peer-on-peer sexual harassment). 
91 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626-27 (2007); See also Ryan, supra note 10, at 1356. 
92 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
93 [d. at 681, 683, 685. Thus, in Morse, the school district employed Fraser to argue that 
because part of the school district's mission was to deter illegal drug use, the school could quash 
speech in opposition to that mission. The school district in Morse was not the first to make such 
an argument. See Boroffv. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000). 
94 220 F.3d at 467, 469. 
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No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth"; the back of the same T-shirt fea-
tured the word "BELIEVE" with "LIE" highlighted.95 The Sixth Circuit's two-
judge majority concluded that the T-shirt could be prohibited under Fraser be-
cause this T-shirt and the others "contain symbols and words that promote val-
ues that are so patently contrary to the school's educational mission.,,96 The 
principal had described the school's mission as "to be respectful of others and 
others' beliefs.'.97 As in Harper, by prohibiting Boroffs speech the school 
demonstrated that it was more tolerant of some of its students' views than oth-
ers' . 
The appellate dissent's criticism in Boroff was intense, concluding un-
equivocally that the school district's action constituted impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination: "Indeed, from Principal Clifton's explanation, it would not be 
unreasonable to presume that if the T-shirt had depicted Jesus in a positive light, 
it would not have been considered 'offensive. ",98 Even though neither the par-
ties nor the courts treated Boroff s speech as religious,99 this case recalls the 
tension present in Harper, Nixon, Zamecnik, and K.D. when so-called suppor-
tive or positive viewpoints are permitted (in actuality or hypothetically), but 





On this topic, the Fraser Court noted: 
These fundamental values of "habits and manners of civility" 
essential to a democratic society must, of course, include toler-
ance of divergent political and religious views, even when the 
views expressed may be unpopular. But these "fundamental 
values" must also take into account consideration of the sensi-
bilities of others, and in the case of a school, the sensibilities of 
fellow students. 101 
[d. at 467. 
[d. at 470. 
[d. at 469. 
[d. at 473 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
99 [d. at 470 (Gilman, J., dissenting) ("The record is devoid of any evidence that the T-shirts, 
the 'three-headed Jesus' T-shirt particularly, were perceived to express any particular political or 
religious viewpoint."). 
100 Harper, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded 
with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. 
Ohio 2005). 
Although the rule of pennitting positive messages but disallowing negative ones may be 
appealing to some as a bright-line policy, it is not a panacea. For example, under this rule a "Ho-
mosexuality is shameful" T-shirt would be barred. But, what positive message expresses this 
same message? A stick figure man plus a stick figure woman "= Marriage"? "Straight pride"? 
The connotations are different, but the underlying message is the same and it is not a positive one. 
See also Taylor, supra note 17, at n.34. 
101 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
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Professor Marty Lederman views this excerpt from Fraser to mean that "view-
point discrimination is, in fact, inconsistent with the core functions of a public 
school.,,102 His reading emphasizes the first part of the excerpt, that students 
should learn to exercise tolerance for different and even unpopular ideas they 
hear. Yet, the second part of the excerpt (concern about other students) qualifies 
the first part and suggests that restrictions on the student speaker also could 
comprise part of an appropriate training in civic discourse. To a degree this 
latter sentiment echoes the school districts' arguments in Boroffand Morse, and 
also is reminiscent of the second test in Tinker. However, Fraser's language is 
milquetoast compared to Tinker's rights of others discussion. 103 
Like Tinker, Fraser never directly addresses whether viewpoint dis-
crimination is permitted in schools, although the question of viewpoint dis-
crimination is further away from the categorically unprotected speech in Fraser 
than from the political speech in Tinker that is presumptively protected. 
3. Hazelwood's School-Sponsored Speech 
The next case, Hazelwood, is the only case of these first three to directly 
engage a forum analysis, and the one to deal most closely (although still not 
explicitly) with viewpoint discrimination. This case began when a high school 
principal excised two pages of the school newspaper before publication because 
those pages contained, separately, articles about teenage pregnancy and divorce 
which the principal believed were inappropriate for the student audience and did 
not reflect proper journalistic practices. 104 The Court first determined that be-
cause the school did not intentionally designate the school newspaper as a pub-
lic forum, the school could restrict the contents of the newspaper (the forum) in 
"any reasonable manner," and reasonableness in that case meant having "legiti-
mate pedagogical concerns.,,105 This speech had the dual character of being 
student speech and also being school-sponsored speech, and the school could 
restrict the speech because of its authority to control speech attributable to it. 106 
Hazelwood's primary contribution to the viewpoint discrimination de-
bate grew out of this concern about the school controlling speech it could appear 
to be endorsing: "[ a] school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor 
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol 
102 Marty Lederman, When is Viewpoint Discrimination a Constitutional Virtue?, SCOTUS-
blog (Mar. 19,2007), http://www.scotusblog.com. 
103 If the school is able to determine its own mission and its obligations to students include 
preparation for citizenship, a policy that students act in a manner respectful of one another may 
further its purpose. However, depending on the specific contours of such a policy, a school dis-
trict may explicitly be permitting viewpoint discrimination in a way that would extend beyond 
Tinker's protections. 
104 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). 
105 [d. at 267-70,273. 
106 [d. at 271-72. 
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use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values 
of a civilized order. ",107 In this way, when students' speech effectively also 
becomes the speech of the school, public schools are no different from other 
governmental bodies which can engage in viewpoint discrimination regarding 
their own messages. lOS Yet, writing in dissent, Justice Brennan honed in on that 
aspect of the majority's decision: "The case before us," he wrote, "aptly illus-
trates how readily school officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint dis-
crimination as the 'mere' protection of students from sensitive topics.,,109 
However, the extent to which Hazelwood applies when government is 
merely permitting student speech (e.g., a student is not prohibited from wearing 
a T-shirt) as opposed to sponsoring it (e.g., the school newspaper) is unclear. 
Thus, as recently as 2005, the Second Circuit identified a circuit split on the 
question of "[w]hether Hazelwood represents a departure from the long-held 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in any and all government restriction of 
private speech"lIo (emphasis added) such as the student religious speech T-shirt 
situations. 
107 [d. at 272 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has read this provision of Hazelwood as 
permitting content-based discrimination. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (l1th Cir. 
1989). 
108 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); 
Downs v. L.A .. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000); Hansen v. Ann Arbor 
Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003). See also Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 
631 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (7th Cir.1980); Cary v. Bd. of Educ. Arapahoe Sch. Dist, 598 F.2d 535, 
543 (10th Cir.1979) (both permitting the school to engage in viewpoint discrimination regarding 
its own message). 
During oral argument in Morse, members of the current Court suggested on a more general 
note that the viewpoint neutrality requirement does not apply to curricular speech in the class-
room, and could not do so without derailing the educational process. (Chief Justice Roberts) 
Transcript of Oral Arg., Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), available at http://www.supremecour-
tus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-278.pdf. 
JUSTICE ALITO: I find that a very ... disturbing argument, because schools 
have and they can define their educational mission so broadly that they can 
suppress all sorts of political speech and speech expressing fundamental val-
ues of the students, under the banner of ... getting rid of speech that's incon-
sistent with educational missions. 
Transcript of Oral Arg. at 20, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), available at http://www.supreme-
courtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-278.pdf ; see also Marty Lederman, Brief 
Notes on Morse Oral Argument, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com!. 
109 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 288,283 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing viewpoint discrimina-
tion as "illegitimate"). 
110 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
Emily Gold Waldman provides a thorough discussion of the two circuit splits growing out of 
Hazelwood. See Waldman, supra note 45, passim. 
Not all cases cited by the Second Circuit in Peck involve students' speech .. The First and 
Tenth Circuits have expressly held that educators may "make viewpoint-based decisions about 
school-sponsored speech." Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-I, 298 F.3d 918, 926-28 
(lOth Cir. 2002). See also Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (Ist Cir. 1993). The Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits have, instead, decided that Hazelwood did not alter the general requirement of 
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C. Viewpoint Discrimination in a Limited Public Forum 
A well-known tenet of constitutional law is that government action that 
discriminates among speakers based on their viewpoint is presumptively inva-
lid. 111 The Court itself has applied this principle in the public elementary and 
secondary school context. ll2 So, how can the Court's student speech cases po-
tentially override this general rule and permit viewpoint discrimination? 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District l13 and 
Good News Club v. Milford Central School l14 are the most on point of any of 
the Court's cases explicitly addressing viewpoint discrimination, yet even they 
are not on all fours with the type of situations examined in this article. Both 
Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club involved religious speech and occurred in 
the public elementary and secondary school setting. 115 However, the speech at 
issue was not students '-it belonged to community organizations who were 
denied the opportunity to use school facilities during non-school hours when the 
school facilities were opened to the public for specific uses. 116 At this point in 
viewpoint neutrality in non-public fora. See Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County 
Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817,829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (applying, without discussion, the Corne-
lius viewpoint neutrality standard to a nonpublic school forum); Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7; 
see also Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
"despite the absence of express 'viewpoint neutrality' discussion anywhere in Hazelwood, the 
Planned Parenthood court incorporated 'viewpoint neutrality' analysis into nonpublic forum, 
school-sponsored speech cases in our Circuit" (citing Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 825), but 
deciding, ultimately, that Hazelwood did not supply the appropriate standard for the issue before 
it). A panel of the Third Circuit held that a viewpoint restriction "may reasonably be related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns" and therefore constitutional, but on rehearing en banc, the circuit 
was equally-divided on the question. See C.H. ex rei. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 
1999), vacated and reh'g en banc granted by 197 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd in part en banc by 
an equally divided court, vacated and remanded in part, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir .2000) (affirming 
the district court judgment regarding one expressive act without explication and deciding the 
remaining expressive issue on procedural grounds, thereby obviating the need to reach the view-
point neutrality question); see also Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining Hazelwood: The Needfor a 
Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in the School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 
231-38 (2004). 
III Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). The 
Supreme Court also has applied this principle to the higher education context, striking down a 
university's decision to deny publication funding to a religious student organization. Rosenberger 
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,845-46 (1995). 
112 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
113 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384. 
114 Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98. 
115 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98. 
116 In Lamb's Chapel, the local school board's policy was adopted pursuant to a state statute 
that allowed public schools to be used during non-school hours for specific purposes, including 
"social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainment, and other uses pertaining to the wel-
fare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and shall 
be open to the general public." 508 U.S. at 386. Because religious meetings were not included in 
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time, after the school day had ended, the school facilities were fairly inter-
changeable with other government buildings such as the city hall or a commu-
nity center. Thus, because of their facts, neither Lamb's Chapel nor Good News 
Club had to fully engage the issue of viewpoint discrimination in the school-as-
active-educational-setting context. lI7 As such, one important distinction be-
tween those two cases and the student T-shirt speech situations is that the regu-
lation of speech in Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club occurred in a limited, 
or designated, public forum as opposed to the closed forum in which the student 
T-shirt speech controversies usually OCCUr. IIS That is not to say that these cases 
are wholly irrelevant to the situations examined in this article, but rather that 
their presumptive prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in a limited pub-
lic forum could be justifiably distinguished. 
First, in Lamb's Chapel, a local church asked to use school facilities af-
ter hours to show films about parenting. 119 The school district denied the 
church's request because the films approached these issues from a religious per-
spective and the district was concerned that permitting such use of its facilities 
would constitute an Establishment Clause violation. l2O In 1993, the Supreme 
Court struck down the district's action as impermissible viewpoint discrimina-
tion. 121 In reaching this result, the Court also rejected the district's argument 
the list, a lower state court had held that religious meetings could not be permitted. [d. at 386-87. 
In Good News Club, the local school board's policy was adopted pursuant to the same provision 
of the state statute as well as one other: that school facilities can be used after hours for "instruc-
tion in any branch of education, learning or the arts." 533 U.S. at 102. 
117 For example, in its Establishment Clause discussion, the Good News opinion takes care to 
distance the disputed events from the classroom setting, focusing on the adult in charge (teacher or 
non-teacher), the time (during school or after school), and the level of parental consent necessary 
(compelled attendance in public school versus parental consent required to attend the club's meet-
ings). [d. at 117-18. 
lIS Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. The forum matters 
because, in general, the more open a forum is, the less the government can regulate the speech 
occurring there. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07. For a discussion of the general 
inapplicability of the forum analysis to situations occurring in public elementary and secondary 
schools during the school day, see Taylor, supra note 17, at 233-36. 
Admittedly, the Day of Silence situations do pose some difficulty for the argument that the 
school is not involved in permitting the speech because, in the usual course of things, the student 
planners secure permission from the school administration before they organize a group of stu-
dents who will refrain from speaking in classes and all other activities throughout the day. Thus, 
the Day of Silence speech is sanctioned by the school in a way that Harper's T-shirt would not be. 
Even if Harper asked for and received advance permission to wear his T-shirt, other students 
probably would not assume it was school-approved and would be even less likely to assume it was 
school-endorsed or school-sponsored. However, this does not necessarily constitute the creation 
and intentional opening of a forum, as with a policy specifying the use of district facilities. And, 
if the students were not remaining silent but instead all planned to wear the same T-shirt, they 
probably would not be as likely to seek advance approval from the school. 
119 508 U.S. at 387. 
120 
121 
[d. at 388-89, 394-95. 
[d. at 392-93. 
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that "den[ying] use of its property to a 'radical' church for the purpose of prose-
lytizing [avoided] threats of public unrest and even violence," noting that facts 
which would substantiate this concern were absent from the record and "in any 
event [this argument] would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the pres-
entation of a [specific] religious point of view about a subject the District oth-
erwise opens to discussion on District property.,,122 Tinker is not applicable in 
the Lamb's Chapel situation because the speech is not a student's nor did it oc-
cur during the school day, but the school district's argument is reminiscent of 
the general concern in Tinker that speech in a school can be suppressed if it is 
disruptive enough. Although the Court was not receptive to this Tinker-type 
argument in Lamb's Chapel based on the facts of the situation or the general 
state of the law, it did not eliminate the possibility that such an exception to the 
generally applicable viewpoint neutrality requirement could exist. 
Second, after Lamb's Chapel, circuits split on the issue of "whether 
speech can be excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious 
nature of the speech"; the Supreme Court took up this issue in Good News Club, 
decided in 2001. 123 In that case, the Court struck down a school district's deci-
sion to deny the request of a community-based religious club for children to 
meet on school premises after school hours. 124 In doing so, the Court stated that 
it "reaffirm[ed] [the] holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger that speech 
discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited 
public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious view-
point.,,125 The Court also explained in depth why the school district's Estab-
lishment Clause "defense" lacked merit. 126 However, it noted that "whether a 
State's interest in avoiding an [actual] Establishment Clause violation would 
justify viewpoint discrimination" remained an open question.127 Like Lamb's 
Chapel, Good News Club thus suggested that the presumptive prohibition 
against viewpoint discrimination in schools even when the forum is limited (and 
not, as is presumed in this article, closed) may be slightly more porous than of-








Id. at 395-96. 
533 U.S. at 106. 
Id. at 120. 
Id. at 111-12 (emphasis added). 
Id. at 112-19. 
Id. at 113. 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky summarizes the general distinction: 
The requirement that the government be content-neutral in its regulation of 
speech means that the government must be both viewpoint neutral and subject 
matter neutral. Viewpoint neutral means that the government cannot regulate 
speech based on the ideology of the message . . . . Subject matter neutral 
means that the government cannot regulate speech based on the topic of the 
speech. 
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D. Bringing Morse into the Viewpoint Discrimination Debate 
As mentioned earlier, Morse-the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner 
case-is not a religious speech case. 129 Yet, it is a case that touches on the issue 
of viewpoint discrimination in the public school setting although the justices' 
opinions addressed this issue only briefly. After summarizing the opinions in 
Morse, this section considers the implications Morse may have regarding view-
point discrimination in the student religious T-shirt speech situations. 
1. The Morse Opinions 
In Morse, a five-justice majority of the Court held that a public high 
school principal acted constitutionally when she required high school student 
Joseph Frederick to take down his infamous "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner 
(displayed when the Olympic torch parade passed in front of the school) and 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When The Government Must Make Content-Based 
Choices, 42 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 199,202-03 (1994). In dissent in Good News Club, Justice Stevens 
suggested that it is consistent with a school's educational mission to define the forum as one in 
which speech from a religious viewpoint is permitted, but religious proselytizing is not. Good 
News Club, 533 U.S. at 130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
The somewhat ill-defined relationship between subject-matter-based and viewpoint-based 
discrimination suggests that the idea of viewpoint neutrality is not uncompromising. Yet, because 
the Court has declared that the prohibition of all religious speech and one religious viewpoint both 
are classified as viewpoint discrimination, massaging that distinction in the context of religious 
speech is difficult. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384-85. Two years after Lamb's Chapel was 
decided, the four dissenters in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 
U.S. 819, 831 (1995), disputed the conclusion that prohibiting religion was viewpoint discrimina-
tion because the prohibition of a class of viewpoints is just as much viewpoint discrimination as 
the prohibition of one, which the majority in Rosenberger reiterated. Compare with id. at 895 
(Souter, J., dissenting). Earlier, in Widmar and Mergens, the Court had classified discrimination 
against religious speech or association as content based. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 
(1981); Mergens v. Bd. of Educ., 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990). 
For further discussion of this issue, see also KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 72-74 (2005); Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1171,1172-73 (1993); c. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First 
Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 118 (1986); Susan Ehrmann, Note, Lamb's 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protections for Reli-
gious Speech Through The Illusion of Public Forum Analysis, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 965, 973 n.53 
(1994) (discussing the teachers' mailboxes case Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983»; Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622,643 
(1994) ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored 
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based."). Highlighting and arguing 
against another possible exception to the viewpoint neutrality requirement, the American Center 
for Law and Justice, filing an amicus brief in Morse, relied on Good News Club to argue that 
Frederick's banner was viewpoint discrimination (because an anti-drug banner presumably would 
have been permissible) and that even the school's pursuit of its educational mission does not jus-
tify viewpoint discrimination. Brief for the Am. Ctr. For Law & Justice a~ Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondent at 6-8, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (Feb. 20,2007) (No. 06-278). 
129 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007). 
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then suspended him.!30 The Court did not employ the first or second Tinker test 
but instead, as in Fraser and Hazelwood, created another discrete category of 
student speech that the school could restrict, in effect another exception to 
Tinker.!3! The limited holding in Morse stated that "schools may take steps to 
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be re-
garded as encouraging illegal drug use .... ,,132 The Court based this conclusion 
on schools' unique relationship to their students, which creates schools' "impor-
tant-indeed, perhaps compelling" interest in deterring drug abuse.!33 The 
Court also explicitly declined to expand the "plainly offensive" standard from 
Fraser to justify the principal's action in Morse, writing that to do so would 
"stretch[] Fraser too far" because "[a]fter all, much political and religious 
speech might be perceived as offensive to some.,,134 The Morse majority opinion 
was written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito. 
Justice Alito also wrote separately to clarify the terms on which he 
joined the majority: 
[The Court] (a) ... goes no further than to hold that a public 
school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would in-
terpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) ... provides no 
support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be inter-
preted as commenting on any political or social issue, including 
speech on issues such as "the wisdom of the war on drugs or of 
legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.,,135 
Because Justice Alito joined the majority opinion in full rather than concurring 
in the judgment, his concurrence appears to provide a useful window into his 
views on these issues, but not to create binding precedent. (Justice Kennedy 
joined Justice Alito's concurrence.)!36 
130 
131 
[d. at 2622-23. 
[d. at passim. 
132 [d. at 2620. Some commentators read Morse as in fact broadly applicable because the justi-
fication supporting the school's action basically "that drugs are really harmful and really illegal" 
applies to "[ vlirtually all restrictive speech policies." Posting of David French to http://phibeta-
cons.nationalreview.comJpostl?q=ZDUxMjJkZwvrnZTBhMjFkYjlwZWU2ZGZiZGRiMjdlM2Q 
= (June 25, 2007, 12:19 p.m.). 
133 [d. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995». 
134 [d. Although this statement refers directly to Fraser, it suggests that a majority of the Court 
does not share the vacated Ninth Circuit panel's view regarding the meaning of Tinker's second 
test. 
135 /d. at 2636 (Ali to, J., concurring). 
136 Justice Alito's first condition may appear to establish Morse's controlling rule because it 
could be characterized as the narrowest point of agreement for the majority. See Posting of 
Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy blog, http://volokh.comJarchives/archive_2007_06_24-
2007_06_30.shtml (June 26,2007, 12:09 a.m.). See also Taylor, supra note 17, at n.23. Further-
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Similarly, Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion and also wrote 
separately to argue that Tinker itself is without constitutional basis.137 Justice 
Breyer concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, preferring to 
decide the case on qualified immunity grounds rather than on its merits. 138 Jus-
tice Stevens wrote for the dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. 139 
The main point of dispute between the majority and the dissent was the banner's 
meaning: the dissent found the banner could not be "reasonably regarded as 
. '11 1 dru ,,140 promotmg 1 ega g use. 
Setting aside this difference on a central question of fact, the Court did 
not diminish protection for students' political speech (as Frederick's speech 
could have been if it advocated, for example, support of the medical use of 
marijuana for pain management).141 Considering dicta in the majority opinion 
as well as language in the concurrences, four of the five justices from the Morse 
majority seem to support the principle of staunchly protecting student political 
speech.142 But even if only Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy would agree with 
this principle, they are joined at least by the three justices in dissent. 143 The 
ramifications of this apparent limited consensus are unclear, however; if stu-
dents' political speech had been the question before the Court, then the Court 
may have had to directly engage the continued viability of the Tinker test. 
2. Implications for Viewpoint Discrimination 
Trying to ascertain what Morse may mean for viewpoint discrimination, 
particularly in the student T-shirt situations that are the focus of this article, is 
important at least in a very practical sense. School administrators regularly 
must make decisions about whether students wearing T-shirts like Harper's, 
Nixon's, Zamecnik's, K.D.'s and Boroffs have done something deserving pun-
ishment-and those decisions often implicate unresolved legal questions such as 
the permissibility of limited viewpoint discrimination. Because of the murki-
more, as Professor Eugene Volokh notes, the same speech could satisfy both of Justice A1ito's 
qualifications, potentially being banned as advocacy of illegal drug use and protected as speech 
about a political or social issue. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy blog, 
supra. 





[d. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
[d. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
See generally id. at 2643-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2620. 
[d. at 2625, 2629; id. at 2649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
142 [d. at 2625-26; id. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2629-36, passim (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (Justice Thomas, who joined the majority opinion, wrote separately in concurrence 
and set forth his opinion that the Court reached the correct outcome because students do not have 
free speech rights in public schools). 
143 [d. at 2649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's concurrence did not address the 
merits of the underlying case. 
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ness of the law in this area, a school district official acting in good faith but 
making the "wrong" decision in these situations (a decision that ultimately is 
detennined to run afoul of the Constitution) presumably would be shielded from 
liability under the principle of qualified immunity.l44 But, many if not most 
school districts and their lawyers would prefer to avoid creating liability in the 
first place. Although the Court's school speech cases do not definitively resolve 
the issue of the pennissibility of even collateral viewpoint discrimination, these 
cases are the best place we have to look for the answer.145 Accordingly, this 
section first reviews the justices' brief, explicit references to viewpoint dis-
crimination in Morse, and then examines the majority's maintenance of the 
"school is different" baseline before discussing the application of the Morse 
principles in the student religious T-shirt context. 
a. Direct Discussion (Though No Resolution) in Morse 
Morse is different from the other student speech cases in that the major-
ity, dissent, and a concurrence each explicitly note the potential implication of 
the viewpoint discrimination issue. Yet in all instances, the discussion in the 
opinions stops short of resolving the open question. 
To begin with, because the majority's holding pennits the school to 
suppress Frederick's speech, the dissent accuses the majority of doing "serious 
violence to the First Amendment in upholding-indeed, lauding-a school's 
decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it disagreed."I46 
The dissent borrows language from Rosenberger and Good News Club for the 
"cardinal First Amendment principle" that "censorship based on the content of 
speech, particularly censorship that depends on the viewpoint of the speaker, is 
subject to the most rigorous burden of justification.,,147 The majority's only 
response to this accusation is to quote the dissent back at itself,148 highlighting 
the dissent's own willingness to entertain the potential pennissibility of limited 
viewpoint discrimination-an understandable but insufficient reply to the dis-
sent's allegations. To be clear, the majority neither refutes the dissent's accusa-
tion nor concedes the point but justifies its action; it does not comment on the 
144 Admittedly, this statement oversimplifies qualified immunity doctrine. For a detailed dis-
cussion on the principle of qualified immunity as it applies to government actors in the context of 
public school discipline, see Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638-43, passim (Breyer, J., concurring). 
145 This is not meant to discount the value of appellate or district courts' decisions, but those 
decisions do not have nationwide precedential effect. For a discussion of the circuit split on 
Hazelwood, including an analysis of how Hazelwood has been applied in cases that reach beyond 
the student speech context, see Waldman, supra note 45, passim. 
146 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644, 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's test invites stark 
viewpoint discrimination. "). 
147 [d. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
148 [d. at 2629. 
HeinOnline -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  218 2007-2008
218 WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 110 
merits of the viewpoint discrimination charge one way or another. 149 Its closest 
statement is the restrictive definition of "plainly offensive" from Fraser, which 
in effect brings Fraser more in line with Tinker's first test. This lack of re-
sponse by the Morse majority creates almost no space for an interpretation other 
than perhaps practical speculation that the majority could not reach a consensus 
on how to respond to the viewpoint discrimination charge. 
Even though the three-justice dissent chastises the majority for engaging 
in viewpoint discrimination,150 the dissent also suggests at two points that per-
haps this "cardinal principle" does or should apply differently in public 
schools. 151 Given its tentative, noncommittal tone in these statements, the dis-
sent seems almost to be wondering aloud about the permissibility of limited 
viewpoint discrimination in the school setting and by doing so undercutting the 
extent of the constitutional evil of which it accuses the majority. 152 It is not 
clear whether the dissent would conclude that students' constitutionally disrup-
tive religious or non-religious speech could be restricted even if such restriction 
amounts to viewpoint discrimination. Furthermore, whether these ideas will 
gain enough support to have a majority at some point is unknown; only three 
justices signed on to these particular statements in Morse. But for now, these 
ideas are consistent with the Court's other student free speech cases.153 
Finally, Justice Alito's concurrence noted approvingly that the Court 




See generally id. 
[d. at 2643 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
[d. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
152 First, the dissent notes that "[h]owever necessary it may be to modify those principles [of 
content and viewpoint neutrality] in the school setting, Tinker affirmed their continuing vitality." 
[d. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This suggests that the dissent assumes Tinker does not negate 
the content or viewpoint presumptions outright, but that practical and/or constitutional constraints 
may limit the ability to achieve or maintain complete content and viewpoint neutrality in public 
schools. 
Second, the dissent states, "Given that the relationship between schools and students 'is 
custodial and tutelary .. .' it might well be appropriate to tolerate some targeted viewpoint dis-
crimination in this unique setting. And while conventional speech may be restricted only when 
likely to 'incit[e] imminent lawless action' it is possible that our rigid imminence requirement 
ought to be relaxed at schools." [d. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)). (Before this statement, the dissent inserts the qualifica-
tion that it is assuming that "the school's concededly powerful interest in protecting its students 
adequately supports" the restriction at issue. [d. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Here, the dis-
sent is echoing the "school is different" sentiment and suggesting without reference to Tinker that 
because of the unique context presented by public elementary and secondary schools, not one but 
two more aspects of free speech doctrine may deserve modification in public schools. Unfortu-
nately, the dissent's speculation stops here. 
153 In his partial concurrence in the judgment and partial dissent, Justice Breyer also accused 
the majority of viewpoint discrimination and expressed concern that the majority opinion "could 
in fact authorize further viewpoint-based restrictions." [d. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). His discussion did not proceed further and also did not address the tenta-
tive viewpoint discrimination concessions offered by the dissent. 
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define its educational mission broadly and quash speech contrary to its mis-
sion. l54 Justice Alito expressed a concern in the same vein as Justice Brennan's 
concern in Hazelwood l5 about viewpoint discrimination: that such an argument 
"can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways" eventually affecting student 
speech on political and social issues. 156 
Thus, Morse is somewhat helpful in that it provides a more direct ac-
knowledgement than the Court's previous student speech cases that student 
speech situations may involve viewpoint discrimination. Although Morse does 
not resolve this issue, it also did not present particularly good facts for doing so. 
b. School is Different, Redux 
Morse also matters because of what it does not change. Specifically, 
the majority and dissent both acknowledge the continued viability of the "school 
is different" premise that is the starting point in speech and other cases where 
the constitutional rules that apply to schools vary from those that apply in non-
school settings. 
In fact, the Morse majority took pains to reconfirm the distinctive nature 
of the school environment and, correspondingly, the constitutional law princi-







• "Fraser's holding demonstrates that 'the constitutional rights 
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings",157; 
• "[Hazelwood] acknowledged that schools may regulate some 
speech 'even though the government could not censor similar 
speech outside the school",158; 
• [S]tudents' rights are limited and "the nature of those rights is 
what is appropriate for children in school,,159; 
• "[T]he school setting requires some easing of the restrictions 
to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily sub-
ject"I60; and 
[d. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concurring). 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 286 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring). 
[d. at 2626. 
[d. at 2627. 
159 [d. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
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• "Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, are different in public schools than else-
where.,,161 
This recitation serves both to confine Morse's application to the school setting 
and also increasingly to separate the legal rules and considerations in cases aris-
ing out of schools from those springing from other contexts. Yet, where does 
the "school is different" argument stop? Of particular importance to this article, 
how does the "school is different" argument apply to the issue of viewpoint dis-
crimination? The opinion of the Court did not address either of those questions. 
The dissent agreed with the majority's presumption that public elemen-
tary and secondary schools present a special context in which constitutional law 
principles often operate differently than in most other contexts, and described 
this premise as "uncontroversial.,,162 Justice Alito's concurrence, however, 
demonstrated much less willingness to employ any "school is different" reason-
ing although he did not seek to overturn any otherwise valid precedent based on 
this concern.163 
c. Restricting Other Viewpoints 
Because Morse's holding is so specific, it appears to carve out only a 
narrow exception to Tinker. l64 Yet, Morse is not entirely confined to its facts. 
As the preceding subsection discussed, the Morse Court reconfirmed the 
strength of the "school is different" premise:65 Additionally, as this article ar-
gues more generally, Morse did not foreclose the possibility that the Court's 
student speech cases can he read together to permit some viewpoint discrimina-
tion. And, viewing Morse at a significantly more abstract level, Morse reaffirms 
the Court's general approach that a school's ability to restrict student speech 
depends on the strength of the governmental interest and the character of the 
speech itself. 
In Morse, the Court took pains to demonstrate the overwhelmingly im-
portant nature of the government interest, emphasizing the dangers and fre-
quency of drug use in school-age children, discussing Congress's recognition of 
160 [d. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985». 
161 [d. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995» (also quoting Bd. 
of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002) (quoting the same 
language from Vernonia». 
162 [d. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
163 Justice Alito wrote that "[t]he special characteristic that is relevant in this case" and which 
justifies "altering the usual free speech rules in the public schools ... is the threat to the physical 
safety of students" who are compelled by law to attend a school of their choice. [d. at 2638 (Ali to, 
J., concurring). 
164 [d. at 2629. 
165 See supra section III.D.2.b. 
HeinOnline -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  221 2007-2008
2007] RELIGIOUS SPEECH AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 221 
this problem, and noting the authorization of "billions of [federal] dollars to 
support state and local drug-prevention programs.,,166 Correspondingly, what 
the majority of the Court took to be Frederick's nonsensical pro-drug speech 
was speech with very little, if any, worth-as Professor Taylor characterizes it, 
importing a term from a nearby area of First Amendment doctrine, "low-value 
speech." 167 Frederick's speech was not religious speech; it was not political 
speech in the conventional sense of the term; it was not even political speech 
that also supported illegal activity because it advocated opposition to and disre-
gard for a particular law. By contrast, it is unclear whether the student speech 
that is the focus of this article would be permitted under that broad balancing 
test. To begin with, the T-shirt speech examined in this article is religious 
speech and thus by definition speech with a higher so-called value than Freder-
ick's banner!68 Yet, it also is aggressive and may cause other students substan-
tial personal distress. 169 
Furthermore, courts seem less likely to view the governmental interest 
in the T-shirt situations to be as compelling as in Morse. It would be difficult to 
find that the aggressive religious statements on students' T-shirts create the 
same sort of actual physical danger to the overwhelming number of public 
school students across the country as illegal drug use does. The physical harm 
most likely to result from a controversial T-shirt would be a fight in a common 
area of a school such as a hallway, cafeteria, or parking lot, although the media 
reports of these situations mainly indicate resulting verbal altercations. 170 Ac-
cordingly, the potential for physical harm in the T-shirt situations seems sub-
stantially more limited. But, avoiding physical harm is not the only possibly 
compelling governmental interest in student speech scenarios. I agree with Pro-
fessor Taylor that the specific harm in Morse is not that other students will be 
motivated by Frederick's banner to start smoking marijuana or to smoke more 
of it, but rather that such an expression trivializes the issue of drug use by mak-
166 
167 
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627-28. 
Taylor, supra note 17, at 228. 
168 For example, the Morse dissent expressed concern that the majority's decision could be 
used to suppress students' religious speech: "While I find it hard to believe the Court would sup-
port punishing Frederick for flying a "WINE SiPS 4 JESUS" banner-which could quite reasona-
bly be construed either as protected religious message or as a pro-alcohol message-the breathtak-
ing sweep of its opinion suggests it would." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
This brief statement certainly does not dictate a clear result in a student religious speech T-shirt 
case, although it does recognize that speech can have multiple types of meaning. Importantly, 
unlike the religious T-shirt situations, the dissent's hypothetical student speech is not provocative 
or aggressive, and thus the interests to be balanced are different. 
169 Thus, it is to a degree similar to Fraser's speech, and yet also implicates the concerns of 
Tinker's second test. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 
2006, cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. 
Ct. 1484 (2007). 
170 See sources cited supra note 4; Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171. 
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ing it the subject of a joke. 171 However, the governmental interest may not need 
to be as strong as it is presented in the Morse majority in order to prevail under 
this more general understanding of Morse. 
Thus, this area of law continues to be an intellectual puzzle, and Morse 
gives only limited clarity to a doctrine in desperate need of it, solving few of 
school districts', administrators', and scholars' questions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional law governing student speech disputes is becoming noto-
riously unpredictable. As Justice Thomas stated in his concurrence in Morse, "I 
am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in 
schools except when they don't-a standard continuously developed through 
litigation against local schools and their administrators.,,172 In this article, I have 
argued for a narrow point of clarity: to the extent a school may restrict student 
speech under one of the Court's four student speech cases, it also may engage in 
at least the amount of viewpoint discrimination that is necessary to allow these 
rules to be fully operational. This conclusion does not create another exception 
to Tinker but rather reinforces it, and has the additional benefit of removing one 
question from the list of those that an administrator must consider when a stu-
dent wearing a T-shirt like Harper's, Nixon's, K.D.'s, or Zamecnik's walks into 
his or her office. 
171 Taylor, supra note 17, at 230. 
\72 Justice Thomas concurred in the opinion of the Court and also wrote separately in Morse: 
"Today, the Court creates another exception [to Tinker]. In doing so, we continue to distance 
ourselves from Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates and 
when it does not." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
